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Abstract
Inter-firm R&D collaborations through contractual arrangements have become in-
creasingly popular, but in many cases they are broken up without any joint discovery.
We provide a rationale for the breakup date in R&D collaboration agreements. More
specifically, we consider a research consortium initiated by a firm A with a firm B. B has
private information about whether it is committed to the project or a free-rider. We
show that under fairly general conditions, a breakup date in the contract is a (second-
best) optimal screening device for firm A to screen out free-riders. With the additional
constraint of renegotiation proofness, A can only partially screen out free-riders: entry
by some free-riders makes sure that A does not have an incentive to renegotiate the
contract ex post. We also propose empirical strategies for identifying the three likely
causes of a breakup date: adverse selection, moral hazard, and project non-viability.
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1 Introduction
The last three decades have witnessed a barrage of inter-firm collaborations on Research
and Development (R&D), particularly in industries like pharmaceuticals, information tech-
nology, aerospace, defense, automotive, consumer electronics, chemicals, instrumentation,
and medical equipment (Hagedoorn, 2002). Out of this increasing popularity of R&D col-
laborations, a noticeable change comes from their organizational arrangements: a majority
of inter-firm R&D partnerships were established not through Research Joint Ventures —
that have been the focus of numerous theoretical studies1 — but through non-equity con-
tractual agreements. Narula and Hagedoorn (1999) report that R&D collaborations via
contractual arrangements account for more than 70% of all R&D partnerships.
The waves of R&D collaborations have attracted a lot of attention among economists
interested in studying the impact of collaboration on R&D productivity. To their surprise,
many R&D consortia broke up after a short period. Kogut (1989) finds a large number
of R&D partnerships failed in the first year. Kale et al. (2002) notice that around 40%
of R&D partnerships were judged as unsuccessful. Reuer and Zollo (2005) further find
that more than half of R&D collaboration agreements were terminated by one partner
or through contract expiration. In fact, the failure rate in biotech-pharmaceutical R&D
alliances is as high as 70% (Hansen, 2003). The high incidence of failure has led some
economists to caution readers about their empirical findings because of the selection effect
due to only more promising research consortia being formed (Danzon et al., 2005).
Why would a firm initiate an R&D collaboration with another and then break up at a
later time? Conventional wisdom points to the story of firms’ finding out that their joint
research projects are not viable during R&D collaboration. This, however, is not the case
in many failed R&D collaborations since often the remaining partner continues the R&D
project on its own.2 Further, in some cases research partners voiced the suspicion that
their partner was not truly committed to the success of the project, either because it could
1For example, Katz (1986), d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), and Kamien et al. (1992). They and
others have justified R&D cooperation on a number of grounds, such as internalizing spillovers, avoiding
duplicate R&D efforts, and capturing technological complementarities. In contrast, the literature on R&D
contracts is sparse. See Section 6 for a discussion of the related literature.
2For example, in 1993 Airbus and Boeing agreed to jointly conduct R&D on Very Large Commercial
Transport. The cooperation was ended in 1995, after which Airbus continued to develop the super jumbo jet
A380 by itself. Similar observations can be made in the pharmaceutical industry: after having terminated
the R&D collaboration agreement with GlaxoSmithKline, Cytokinetics continues its drug development and
clinical trials.
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cannibalize one of its products or because of the intention to free ride on the other firm’s
effort.3 Ample evidence indicates that R&D partners’ private information about their own
interests and willingness to commit to their joint projects are among the major causes
of R&D collaboration failures.4 Therefore, it is an interesting and insightful approach to
consider how the anticipation of meeting a free-rider affects the choice of collaboration
contracts ex ante. Above all, the termination clause is the most negotiated item in R&D
collaboration contracts (Lerner and Malmendier, 2005).5
In contrast to conventional wisdom, we show that the breakup clause can be seen
as an ex ante efficient measure — it serves as an effective screening device in an R&D
collaboration contract. Using contract theory to analyze R&D collaboration contracts, we
show that under fairly general conditions, a breakup rule in the form of a term limit is
necessary and optimal in screening out bad partners. In particular, a breakup rule makes
sure that only committed research partners agree to participate in a collaboration. The
reason for this is that a breakup rule makes participation less attractive for non-committed
types who are more inclined to drag out the project in order to reap private benefits.
Specifically, we consider a firm A, the principal, that owns the right to conduct R&D
on a project and can choose whether to start an R&D consortium with a firm B, the agent.
Firm B’s type is its private information. It can be a committed research partner or a
free-rider. We show that a breakup becomes necessary when there is a misalignment of
incentives: while the principal prefers to collaborate with a committed agent because it
generates higher profits for the principal, a free-rider actually has higher private benefits
than a committed agent.6 This misalignment of incentives turns out to be quite common in
3Esty and Ghemawat (2002) quote an Airbus employee suspecting that the research collaboration be-
tween Airbus and Boeing failed because Boeing had different objectives and did not want to see the new
super jumbo jet cannibalize their 747 product line.
4For example, see Mahnke and Overby (2008). The authors observe that many R&D collaborations fail
because “the participants maximize their private benefits at the expense of the common ones”.
5Lerner and Malmendier (2005) find that ”firms pay an enormous amount of attention to negotiating
termination rights. These terms have been described as ’probably the most heavily negotiated (at least
in terms of time) provision’ in biotechnology research agreements.” Hagedoorn and Hesen (2007) find that
termination clauses in R&D collaboration contracts have attracted more attention in the recent economics
and management literature. A termination clause usually includes both a termination date and post-
termination arrangements such as payments and control right allocation. Termination dates are widely
observed in R&D collaboration contracts. In an empirical analysis of 52 R&D collaboration contracts in
the telecommunications equipment industry, Ryall and Sampson (2009) note that firms usually set a fixed
termination date for joint R&D development. They also note that having an explicit termination clause ex
ante could facilitate the smooth functioning of the R&D collaboration contract.
6We relax this assumption in the section on multidimensional types: breakup can be optimal as long as
the agent’s private benefit is not perfectly negatively correlated with the principal’s profit.
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the pharmaceutical industry where big pharmaceutical firms free-ride small research firms’
R&D by accepting collaboration requests but providing little cooperation.7 Upon success,
the big pharmaceutical firm can reap much higher benefits due to economies of scale and
scope in the industry. In this respect, our story is especially relevant in explaining the high
frequency of breakups in pharmaceutical R&D consortia. In particular, we show in a setup
with the possibility of commitment to a breakup that if the ratio of free-riders is large, the
optimal contract is a single fully separating contract with a breakup date. The principal is
willing to incur the cost of inefficient breakup with a committed research partner in order
to avoid the cost of a likely cooperation with a free-rider. However, if the ratio of free-riders
is small, then the principal is willing to take the small risk of cooperation with a free-rider
rather than bearing the cost of an inefficient breakup with a research partner who is likely
to be committed. Hence, the principal chooses a pooling contract without a breakup date.
Our second contribution concerns the time inconsistency problem of a breakup date as
a screening device: while it is ex ante efficient to include a breakup clause to screen the
committed agents, ex post – after the agent revealed its type – it may not be optimal to
actually break up. We extend the setup to one with imperfect commitment: the principal
cannot commit not to renegotiate the contract. We show that the solution of this con-
tracting under imperfect commitment problem can take two forms: a pooling contract or
a partially separating contract. The pooling contract is clearly renegotiation proof since
the agent does not reveal its type. The partially separating contract (or equilibrium), in
which free-riders randomize between participating and not, is renegotiation proof because
the fraction of free-riders makes the principal (weakly) better off by not continuing the
cooperation. Furthermore, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which a
renegotiation proof single partially separating contract is feasible and is preferred by the
principal to both the pooling contract and to the principal conducting research alone. If
the ratio of free-riders is low, the principal cannot credibly commit to breakup. However,
if commitment to a breakup is credible, i.e. a breakup clause is renegotiation proof, then
breakup is optimal for the principal.
Our results have relevance for the empirical study of R&D collaborations. Empirical
studies on R&D cooperation often face a challenging problem — firms with strong R&D
capabilities, which are typically more committed, are more likely to participate in R&D col-
7See Hansen (2003) for this asymmetric contractual arrangements in biotech-pharmaceutical industries.
Danzon et al. (2005) provide evidence on counter-productive R&D when small firms collaborate with large
firms with broad scopes.
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laborations. This selection problem has become the ”probably single greatest econometric
problem facing any analysis seeking to measure the impact of government support on com-
mercial R&D activity” (Branstetter and Sakakibara, 2002). The problem of asymmetric
information has been recognized in the empirical studies of R&D collaboration contracts,8
but little has been accomplished in disentangling hidden information, hidden action, and
imperfect knowledge of the viability of the project. This is because the identification of
adverse selection and moral hazard is widely considered a challenging problem since both
of them are unobservable. Our model tells a story from the adverse selection perspec-
tive, although hidden action and unknown viability may also play a role empirically. A
full-blown empirical analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, we propose
several empirical identification strategies to determine the role of termination dates (see
Section 5). In addition, the closed form solution from our simple model generates many
empirically testable hypotheses. For example, our results show that a firm that has better
possibilities of commitment (e.g. because a firm is large or known to be a long-run player
in the industry9) is more likely to include a breakup clause with its partner and to actually
break up, once the breakup date is due.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the model
and Section 3 discusses the main results under perfect commitment. Section 4 considers
contracts when commitment is not possible. Section 5 discusses several empirical strategies
for identifying the role of the termination date. Section 6 discusses the related literature
and concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We consider a principal-agent problem with two firms, A and B. Firm A, the principal,
owns the right to conduct a certain R&D project and considers inviting firm B, the agent,
to form a research consortium. Firm B has private information about its type. Firm B’s
type may either be ”committed” (C) or ”free-rider” (F ). Firm A prefers cooperation with
type C but not type F . The reason could be literally that a committed partner is valuable
8The right of termination has not been studied from a contract theoretical perspective in empirical
literature until recently. Lacetera (2009) studies the control right among industry-university R&D collab-
oration contracts. Lerner and Malmendier (2010) test the cross-substitution problem in biotech research
collaborations.
9Note that firm size or whether a firm is a long-run player as a proxy for commitment power may have
some endogeneity issues if not all characteristics are controlled for.
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to the project, but a free-rider is not. Alternatively, type F may know that it will not come
out with a competing product in the future and only joins the consortium to free-ride firm
A; in this case firm A would prefer not forming a research consortium with firm B. A type
C firm is committed to the same market targeted by this R&D project and does have a
potential competing product. As a result, getting it on board will ensure that competition
will be less tough if a consortium is formed. We assume the probability that B is of type i
is αi, i = C,F , where αC = 1− αF .
Further, in most of the paper we consider the case in which there is a misalignment
of incentives: while A prefers cooperation with a committed type to cooperation with a
free-rider, a free-rider has higher private benefits than a committed type. We will formalize
this later on and also discuss the case without a misalignment of incentives.
More specifically, assume the arrival time of discovery is exponentially distributed. If
A conducts the research alone, the arrival rate is λ, and if research is done in a consortium,
it is λT . Because firm A is seeking to collaborate with a potential competitor, its payoff
depends on firm B’s type. In particular, for B having type i = C,F the outcome of the
project has value wi for A if it conducts research together with B, and w
i
A if it conducts
the research alone. B’s value from the success of the project is vi. B has a sunk cost ki
of joining the project, which can be interpreted as the cost of setting up a research lab or
the cost of disclosing its existing knowledge to A. If B does not join the project, A incurs
additional startup costs kA. In each period that the research project is conducted, A has
flow costs 1. B’s flow costs are εi for i = C,F . Finally, let r be the discount factor.
If B joins the consortium and there is a breakup later on, A does not have to incur
the setup costs kA. This can be either thought of as the initial investment by B falling
into the possession of A after termination or alternatively as B revealing some of its prior
knowledge to A at the beginning of the collaboration. In the latter case, A can use the
knowledge it acquired from B even after cooperation ends.10
The basic ingredients of the model become clearer if we write down expected net
present value revenues in a first-best setup without informational asymmetries about B’s
type. Let Ti be the date at which firm A breaks up with firm B with type i. We will
first look at A’s profit. If discovery occurs before breakup at some time t < Ti, then
10With this interpretation, B revealing its prior knowledge can be viewed as sunk costs, since B irreversibly
loses its competitive advantage that stemmed from this knowledge. One should think of knowledge which
is not patented, but useful for a research project, e.g. the experience that a certain approach to a problem
does not lead to a solution and that one should hence focus one’s attention to other approaches.
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A’s discounted profit is e−rtwi, its discounted flow costs are
∫ t
0 e
−rτ dτ . Since t is expo-
nentially distributed with hazard rate λT , A’s expected profit in case discovery occurs
is
∫ Ti
0 λT e
−λT t
(
e−rtwi −
∫ t
0 e
−rτ dτ
)
dt. With probability
∫∞
Ti
λT e
−λT tdt, no discovery is
made before the breakup date. In this case A loses the flow costs of development be-
fore breakup −
∫ Ti
0 e
−rτ dτ . A continues to conduct research alone. If discovery occurs at
Ti+x, the expected net present value of doing research alone after breakup at period Ti is
e−rTi
(∫∞
0 λe
−λx
(
e−rxwiA −
∫ x
0 e
−rτ dτ
)
dx
)
, which is derived by taking expectations over
x and discounting the profit back to period 0.
Putting this together, A’s profit is
[∫ Ti
0
λT e
−λT t
(
e−rtwi −
∫ t
0
e−rτ dτ
)
dt
]
+
[(∫ ∞
Ti
λT e
−λT tdt
)(
−
∫ Ti
0
e−rτ dτ + e−rTi
(∫ ∞
0
λe−λx
(
e−rxwiA −
∫ x
0
e−rτ dτ
)
dx
))]
=Wi +W
∆
i e
−(r+λT )Ti
where Wi = (λTwi − 1)/(r + λT ) is A’s expected net present value of conducting research
with B without a deadline, W iA = (λw
i
A − 1)/(r + λ) is A’s expected net present value
of conducting the project alone after breaking up with B, and W∆i = W
i
A − Wi is the
difference between the two. If A starts the research project on its own, A’s profit will be
W iA − kA.
B’s profit can be calculated the following way. If discovery occurs before breakup, B’s
profit is
∫ Ti
0 λT e
−λT t
(
e−rtvi − εi
∫ t
0 e
−rτ dτ
)
dt, by a logic similar to the one for computing
A’s profit. If breakup occurs before discovery, B has incurred flow costs εi
∫ Ti
0 e
−rτ dτ .
Putting this together, B’s profit (after subtracting the setup cost) is
(∫ Ti
0
λT e
−λT t
(
e−rtvi − εi
∫ t
0
e−rτ dτ
)
dt
)
−
((∫ ∞
Ti
λT e
−λT tdt
)(
εi
∫ Ti
0
e−rτ dτ
))
− ki
= Vi(1− e
−(r+λT )Ti)− ki
where Vi = (λT vi − εi)/(r + λT ) is the net present value of completing the project.
The analysis can be further simplified by introducing the (discounted) probability of
completing the project p = 1 − e−(r+λT )T . A lower probability of completion implies an
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earlier breakup date. Using the one-to-one correspondence between p and the breakup
date T = −(ln(1 − p))/(r + λT ), we can write firms’ profits in terms of p rather than T .
Specifically, A’s profit can be rewritten as
Wi + (1− pi)W
∆
i = piWi + (1− pi)W
i
A
and B’s profit as
piVi − ki.
Joint profit resulting from cooperating is larger than joint profit when A conducts
research alone if Wi + (1 − pi)W
∆
i + piVi − ki > W
i
A − kA for an agent of type i. This is
equivalent to pi(Vi−W
∆
i )−(kA−ki) > 0. In the following we will assume that cooperation
with the committed type increases joint surplus, whereas cooperation with the free-rider
does not.
Assumption 1 (i) kA − kC > 0 > kA − kF
(ii) VC −W
∆
C > 0 > VF −W
∆
F
Assumption 1 (i) means the net benefit of forming a research consortium is positive
with a committed type and negative with a free-rider type. Assumption 1 (ii) means that
joint surplus increases over time in a consortium with a committed type and decreases
with a free-rider. As a result, Assumption 1 implies that for any breakup date, it is joint
surplus maximizing to cooperate with the committed agent and not to cooperate with the
free-rider.11
Note that only the setup costs ki, the probabilities of completion pi, and the derived
quantities, Wi, W
i
A, Vi, matter for firms’ optimization problems; the individual decompo-
sitions in wi, w
i
A, vi, εi, r, λ, λT , and T do not matter. Therefore, we will simplify the
following exposition by basing the analysis on these derived quantities. That the individual
decomposition of the derived quantities do not matter implies, e.g. that the hazard rate of
discovery could be the same or different alone and together (λ = λT or λ 6= λT ) and that
11This is a sufficient condition for cooperation being attractive with a committed agent and unattractive
with a free rider for any breakup date. A necessary and sufficient condition is p(VC −W
∆
C ) + kA − kC >
0 > p(VF − W
∆
F ) + kA − kF for all p ∈ [0, 1], which is equivalent to kA − kC > 0 > kA − kF and
VC − W
∆
C + kA − kC > 0 > VF − W
∆
F + kA − kF . This weaker condition would allow for the case
VF −W
∆
F > VC −W
∆
C , i.e. total welfare is lower with the free-rider, but once the free-rider has joined
and the costs of starting the project sunk, it is better to cooperate with the free-rider. Our analysis could
be extended by additionally considering this case. However, this would complicate the exposition without
adding significant insights.
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A’s value of conducting the project alone may or may not depend on B’s type (wFA = w
C
A
or wFA 6= w
C
A).
It is clear that by Assumption 1 it is first-best to cooperate with the committed type
and to never break up. And it is first-best not to start cooperation with the free-rider.
Hence, without informational asymmetries, breakup should never occur in this setup.
3 Informational Asymmetries
In this section, we will consider the contract firm A will design if firm B has private
information about its type. Firm A may offer three types of contracts. First, a single
separating contract for type C that makes sure that type F does not participate. Second,
a single pooling contract that induces both C and F to participate and offers the same
terms to both. Third, a menu of strictly separating contracts which induces both C and
F to participate and gives them a (strict) incentive to reveal their types. We use the
term strictly separating to have a clear distinction between the menu of strictly separating
contracts and a single pooling contract. A pooling contract can be seen as a menu of weakly
separating contracts: the principal offers two contracts with exactly the same terms, since
the agent is indifferent between the two contracts, it is an equilibrium strategy to report
its type truthfully.
For the single contract case (either separating or pooling), A offers a contract that
consist of a payment S and a probability of completion p. S is the expected net present
value of transfers from A to B. Note that since all types of B have the same discount factor
and the same arrival rate of innovation, the timing of payments cannot be used to separate
the different types. Further, since A also has the same discounting and arrival rate, only
the expected net present value S matters. For the single separating contract, A’s profit
maximization problem is
max
S,p
αC(pWC + (1− p)W
C
A − S) + αF (W
F
A − kA)
s.t. S + pVC − kC ≥ 0
S + pVF − kF ≤ 0
where the first constraint makes sure that C participates and the second that F does not.
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For a single pooling contract, A’s profit maximization problem is
max
S,p
αC(pWC + (1− p)W
C
A ) + αF (pWF + (1− p)W
F
A )− S
s.t. S + pVC − kC ≥ 0
S + pVF − kF ≥ 0
where the constraints make sure that both types participate.
For the menu of separating contracts, A offers a contract (SC , pC) and (SF , pF ) for each
type of agent. We will discuss this case after we study the optimal single separating and
pooling contracts. Finally, if the principal does not cooperate with the agent at all, its
profits are αCW
C
A + αFW
F
A − kA.
A general principle in contract theory is that first-best can be implemented if there is
no misalignment of incentives of the principal and the agent. The following proposition
shows that this also holds in our setup.
Proposition 1 If incentives are aligned, i.e. VC − kC ≥ VF − kF , then the principal
will choose a contract that implements first best with probability of completion p∗∗ = 1
(corresponding to no breakup date, i.e. T ∗ = ∞) and payment S∗∗ = kC − VC . The
committed type participates, the free-rider does not.
Proof. An agent’s utility when accepting the contract is S∗∗+ p∗∗Vi− ki. The committed
type is willing to participate since S∗∗ + p∗∗VC − kC = kC − VC + VC − kC = 0. The
free-rider is not willing to participate since S∗∗+ p∗∗VF − kF = (VF − kF )− (VC − kC) ≤ 0.
For VC − kC ≥ VF − kF , incentives are aligned, since participation by the committed
type rather than the free-rider is better both in terms of joint profits and in terms of the
agent’s private benefits. Therefore, it is costless to induce the agent to reveal his type,
there is no principal agent problem, and a costly breakup clause is not necessary.
In the remainder of the paper we will focus on the case for which incentives are mis-
aligned, so that a costly contract has to be used to screen the agent. This is expressed by
the following condition.
Condition 1 (Misalignment of Incentives) VC − kC < VF − kF .
Appendix B shows how results extend to a multidimensional problem in which incen-
tives are neither perfectly aligned nor perfectly misaligned.
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We will first show that breakup always occurs with a single separating and never occurs
with a pooling contract.
Proposition 2 (i) For a single separating contract, breakup always occurs. The probability
of completion is p∗single = (kF − kC)/(VF − VC) and the payment S
∗
single = kC − p
∗
singleVC .
p∗single corresponds to a breakup date T
∗
single = −[ln(1− (kF − kC)/(VF − VC)]/[r + λT ].
(ii) For a pooling contract, breakup never occurs (T ∗pool = ∞). The probability of com-
pletion is p∗pool = 1 and the payment S
∗
pool = kC − VC .
(iii) A prefers a single separating contract to a single pooling contract if and only if
αC
(
1− p∗single
)
(VC −W
∆
C ) < αF (W
∆
F + kC − VC − kA). (1)
Proof. (i) Note that the incentive compatibility constraint for C must be binding, other-
wise the principal can reduce S, which still makes sure that F does not participate, and
hence increase the principal’s profit. Solving C’s incentive compatibility constraint yields
S = kC−VCp, substituting this into F
′s incentive compatibility constraint S+VFp−kF ≤ 0
and rearranging gives
p ≤
kF − kC
VF − VC
.
The principal’s problem can hence be rewritten as
max
S
αC(WC +W
∆
C − kC + (VC −W
∆
C )p) + αF (W
F
A − kA)
s.t. p ≤
kF − kC
VF − VC
.
Assumption 1 implies that VC−W
∆
C is positive and hence the upper bound for p is binding,
which completes the proof of part (i).
(ii) Since the maximand and the constraints are linear and the left-hand side of both
constraints is increasing in p, the problem has a bang-bang solution, i.e. p is either 0 or 1.
If it is 0, the principal lets the agent start up the project, breaks up immediately, and
continues the project alone. To satisfy the individual rationality constraints of both types,
S − kC ≥ 0 and S − kF ≥ 0, the principal has to pay S
∗ = kF . However, in this case,
the principal is better off by excluding the free-rider by reducing the payment to S∗ = kC .
This results in a single separating contract that clearly dominates a pooling contract with
p∗ = 0.
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If p∗ = 1, the constraints become
S + VC − kC ≥ 0
S + VF − kF ≥ 0.
By Condition 1, if the constraint for C is satisfied, it also has to be satisfied for F . Hence,
the principal will set the first constraint binding which yields
S∗ = kC − VC .
(iii) Profits with a single separating contract are
Πsingle = αC(W
C
A − kC + (VC −W
∆
C )
kF − kC
VF − VC
) + αF (W
F
A − kA)
and for the single pooling contract
Πpool = αCWC + αFWF + VC − kC.
The difference of profits can be rearranged to
Πsingle −Πpool = −αC
(
1− p∗single
)
(VC −W
∆
C ) + αF (W
∆
F + kC − VC − kA).
This implies the part (iii) of the proposition.
Figure 1 provides an intuition for statements (i) and (ii) in the Proposition, which
illustrates type i’s utility Ui = S + pVi − ki. Note that type F ’s utility (the solid line) has
a larger slope in p than type C (the dashed line). A would like to collaborate with type
C as long as possible but the latest breakup date is at the intersection of the two lines in
Figure 1 if A wants to separate the two types. In other words, a single crossing condition
holds. Alternatively, A may pool both types and make sure that the dashed line, type C ′s
expected utility at the breakup date is equal to 0, so that type C’s individual rationality
constraint is binding. This leads to setting p = 1. Note that for (kF − kC)/(VF − VC) < 0
(i.e. kF − kC and VF − VC have different signs) and for (kF − kC)/(VF − VC) > 1 (i.e. no
misalignment of incentives, a violation of Condition 1), no breakup clause can be found
that separates the two types of agents (i.e. there is no p∗single ∈ [0, 1]). In these cases there
will be no breakup date in the contract, since either first-best can be implemented, the
12
principal is willing to bear the cost of cooperating with a free-rider with probability αF ,
or a consortium is never started in the first place.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
p
-2
-1
1
2
3
U
Figure 1: Utility of type C and type F agent as a function of the probability of completing
p, S + pVC − kC (dashed) and S + pVF − kF (solid).
Inequality (1) in part (iii) of the Proposition can be interpreted the following way.
The left-hand side is the opportunity cost of breaking up with the committed type rather
than pooling: VC −W
∆
C is the value of cooperating with the committed type and 1 − p
∗
the probability of breaking up. The right-hand side is the cost of pooling. W∆F is the
efficiency loss due to cooperating with the free-rider rather than conducting the project
alone. kC − VC is the payment of the principal to the free-rider. kA is the setup cost if
principal conducts the R&D by itself. Therefore, the difference between W∆F + kC − VC
and kA is the net efficiency loss due to pooling. A single separating contract is preferable
to the principal if the cost of breaking up with the good type is less than the net cost of
pooling. Furthermore, if the fraction of free-riders αF is large, the principal will choose the
single separating contract.
Note that the probability of completion p∗single is larger the larger setup costs of the
free-rider kF and the private benefit of the committed type VC , and the smaller the setup
costs of the committed type kC and the private benefit of the free-rider VF . Since T
∗
single =
−(ln(1 − p∗single))/(r + λT ), the same comparative statics applies to the optimal breakup
date T ∗single, with the additional effects that the breakup date decreases with the discount
factor r and the discovery rate λT .
A third type of arrangement that firm A can offer is a menu of contracts, in which case,
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the principal’s problem is as follows.
max
SC ,pC ,SF ,pF
αC(pCWC + (1− pC)W
C
A − SC) + αF (pFWF + (1− pF )W
F
A − SF ) (2)
s.t. SC + pCVC − kC ≥ 0 (3)
SF + pFVF − kF ≥ 0 (4)
SC + pCVC − kC ≥ SF + pFVC − kC (5)
SF + pFVF − kF ≥ SC + pCVF − kF (6)
1 ≥ pC , pF ≥ 0 (7)
where the first and second constraints stem from individual rationality and the third and
fourth from incentive compatibility.
Lemma 1 For a menu of strictly separating contracts, we must have
pF > pC
SC > SF .
Proof. The two incentive compatibility constraints, (5) and (6) imply
(VF − VC) (pF − pC) ≥ 0.
By Assumption 1 and Condition 1, we must have VF > VC , which implies
pF ≥ pC .
Observe that pF = pC ⇔ SC = SF . Hence, we must have pF > pC if the contract is strictly
separating. Similarly, we can prove SC > SF .
This lemma illustrates an unpleasant feature of the menu of separating contracts. The
principal is not willing to collaborate with type F . However, in order to separate type C
from type F, the principal has to offer a contract that contains a later breakup date for the
free-rider type it does not want to collaborate with. Fortunately, the following proposition
shows that the principal prefers not to offer a menu of separating contracts because the
payoff from a menu of separating contracts is dominated by a single separating contract.
Proposition 3 A menu of separating contracts is dominated by the optimal single sepa-
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rating contract.
The proof is rather technical and therefore relegated to Appendix A. Intuitively, the
reason is that costly breakup is necessary both in a single separating contract and in a
menu of separating contracts. If the principal has to incur the cost of a breakup anyway,
he can just as well exclude the inefficient free rider.
4 Renegotiation Proofness
We have so far assumed that the principal can commit to terminating the R&D consortium
at the breakup date set in the contract. In some situations this is a reasonable assumption.
For example, the principal forms research consortia repeatedly and fears to lose its reputa-
tion if it announces to break up the consortium in advance, but extends it once the breakup
date is due. In other situations, commitment is difficult or even impossible. For example,
the principal may not be playing a repeated game, because it is unlikely to form a new
research consortium, or at least a consortium at which as much is at stakes. Furthermore,
if details of the cooperation do not become publicly known, the principal does not have to
fear for its reputation when dealing with other research partners in the future.
The difficulty in commitment is an issue especially for the single separating contract: the
breakup date, induces the free-rider not to participate in R&D cooperation; therefore, the
principal knows that an agent that cooperates has to be the committed type and breakup
is inefficient. When the breakup date is due, it is tempting to renegotiate the contract and
continue cooperation, since it is ex post efficient. However, if the free-rider expects this, it
will not be deterred from entry by a non-credible breakup date. The following proposition
formalizes this idea.
Proposition 4 If the principal offers a single separating contract with probability of com-
pletion p∗ = (kF −kC)/(VF −VC) and payment S
∗ = kC −p
∗VC , the committed agent joins
the consortium and the free-rider does not join the consortium, then
(i) breakup is not a credible threat and
(ii) a free-rider has the incentive to join the consortium at the beginning.
Proof. Consider the situation at period T ∗, when breakup is due. The utility of an agent
that has already joined the consortium is the same as in our original setup, except that
the costs of starting the consortium ki are sunk. Utility is hence U˜i(S, p) = S + pVi for
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i = F,C. Other than that, the problem is the same because of the exponential distribution
of the discovery rate.
Assume that only the committed type joined the consortium. The principal considers
renegotiating the contract with the agent and offering a new contract with (remaining)
probability of completion p = 1 − e−(r+λT )(T−T
∗), where T and T ∗ are the new and old
breakup date respectively, and S is the transfer. The principal’s maximization problem is
max
S,p
pWC + (1− p)W
C
A − S
s.t. S + pVC ≥ 0
By the same reasoning as before, it can be shown that the constraint is binding, hence S =
−pVC . Therefore, the principal’s maximization problem becomes maxpW
C
A +p(VC−W
∆
C ).
Since the expression in parentheses is positive by assumption, the principal will want to set
p∗ = 1 and S∗ = VC , which results in profits W
C
A + VC −W
∆
C . Since the costs of starting
up the consortium are already sunk, continuing the project alone would generate profits
WCA for the principal, which is less than W
C
A + VC −W
∆
C . Therefore, the principal has
the incentive to renege on his threat of breakup and extend the consortium. This proves
part (i). Part (ii) holds because a free-rider essentially faces a contract without a breakup
clause in the beginning. If C’s utility S+VC −kC is non-negative, where S is the expected
net present value of total payments (initial and at renegotiation), then so is F ’s utility
S + VF − kF by Condition 1.
Proposition 4 implies that if firm A cannot commit to breakup at the date stipulated
in the single separating contract, the contract is no longer renegotiation proof. More
generally, the revelation principle fails if there is imperfect commitment: once an agent
reveals its type, the principle is tempted to use this information to renege on ex post
inefficient threats. Hence, it is not sufficient to restrict one’s attention to contracts that
induce each type of agent to reveal its type truthfully. However, as Bester and Strausz
(2001) show, a slightly modified version of the revelation principle holds in a one-agent-
setup even without commitment. For any optimal contract, there exists a contract with the
following properties. The message space is equal to the agent’s type space. The agent sends
with positive probability a message which is equal to its type. The crucial difference is that
the probability may be less than one, in which case the agent randomizes. Randomization
has to be such that the principal has to have the incentive to do the required action ex
post. We will apply this approach in the remainder of this section to derive renegotiation
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proof contracts.
According to Proposition 2 of Bester and Strausz (2001), we can restrict ourselves to
direct revelation mechanisms in which an agent reports his true type with positive proba-
bility. An additional constraint is that the principal has to have an incentive ex post to do
what he had promised (or threatened) to do ex ante. For a single separating contract this
means that free-riders randomize between accepting the contract and not. The probability
of randomization has to be such that the principal does not have an incentive to continue
the consortium at the breakup date. Note that the concepts of contract (or mechanism)
and equilibrium are somewhat blurred when considering contracting under imperfect com-
mitment: an optimal renegotiation proof mechanism is such that the strategies played by
all players are part of a Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, see Bester and Strausz (2001)
for more details.
Proposition 5 A single separating contract is renegotiation proof iff free-riders play a
mixed strategy consisting of participating in the consortium with probability q and not par-
ticipating with probability 1− q, where q satisfies the condition
q ≥ q∗ :=
αC(VC −W
∆
C )
αF (W
∆
F − VC)
.
If q∗ ≤ 1 (which is equivalent to αC(VC −W
∆
C ) ≤ αF (W
∆
F − VC)), a renegotiation proof
single separating contract is feasible, otherwise it is not.
Proof. Denote by q the probability that a free-rider accepts the contract. Note that in
the single separating contract specified previously made sure that free-riders are indifferent
between participating and not, hence randomization is an equilibrium strategy for a free-
rider.
At the breakup date, it is not possible for the principal to offer a new contract which is
a single separating contract. This is because U˜F (S, p) > U˜C(S, p) for all S and p ∈ (0, 1].
A menu of separating contracts is dominated by a single separating contract for the same
reasoning as in Proposition 2 above. Note that the only difference to Proposition 2 is
that the setup costs are sunk, which can be seen as kC = kF = kA = 0, but the proof is
otherwise the same as for Proposition 2.
Therefore, we only need to consider a single pooling contract. The principal’s maxi-
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mization problem when renegotiating a new contract is
maxp,S αC(pWC + (1− p)W
C
A ) + αF q(pWF + (1− p)W
F
A )− (αC + αF q)S
s.t. S + pVF ≥ 0
S + pVC ≥ 0.
Since VF > VC , constraints for type C are binding and we can set S = −pVC . Substituting
S into A’s profit function yields
αCWC + αF qWF + p[αC(VC −W
∆
C ) + αF q(VC −W
∆
F )]
To make sure that A does not have an incentive to extend the breakup date (i.e. increase
p), the expression in square brackets has to be weakly negative. Since VC < W
∆
F by
Assumption 1, the expression is weakly negative iff q ≥ q∗, where q∗ satisfies αC(VC −
W∆C ) + αF q
∗(VC −W
∆
F ) = 0, which implies the proposition.
The intuition for the condition αC(VC − W
∆
C ) ≤ αF (W
∆
F − VC) is that if all free-
riders were to join, it would be unprofitable for the principal to renegotiate the contract
and continue the consortium. If the condition does not hold, the principal always has an
incentive to renegotiate, which renders the contract non-renegotiation proof.
Having the condition for the contract being renegotiation proof, we can derive the
optimal single separating contract.
Proposition 6 Suppose VC ≤ αCW
∆
C + αFW
∆
F . In the optimal single separating rene-
gotiation proof contract (partially separating contract), the probability of completion is
p∗ = (kF − kC)/(VF − VC) and the payment S
∗ = kC − p
∗VC . Type C participates for sure
and type F participates with probability q∗ = αC(VC−W
∆
C )/[αF (W
∆
F −VC)]. The probability
of completion p∗ corresponds to a breakup date T ∗ = −[ln(1−(kF −kC)/(VF −VC)]/[r+λT ].
Proof. The assumption VC ≤ αCW
∆
C + αFW
∆
F makes sure q
∗ is well defined and the
single separating renegotiation proof contract is feasible. Since p∗ makes sure that both
type C and type F agents are indifferent between participating and not, it is an optimal
strategy for C to participate for sure and for F to randomize with probability q∗. By the
reasoning of the previous proposition, it is (also ex post) optimal for the principal not to
renegotiate the contract at the breakup date. While the contract is renegotiation proof for
all values q ≥ q∗, the participation of free-riders is inefficient. Therefore, it is optimal for
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the principal if the lower bound is reached and free-riders randomize with probability q∗.
We can also compare profits to the pooling contract. Note that a single pooling contract
is obviously renegotiation proof, since no information is revealed to the principal and the
principal is hence not tempted to use information to change ex post inefficient outcomes.
Proposition 7 Suppose VC ≤ αCW
∆
C + αFW
∆
F . A’s profits in this partially separating
contract are
Πpsep = αC(WC − kC)− αF q
∗(W∆F + kC − kA) + αF (W
F
A − kA) > Πpool.
That is, firm A prefers a single separating contract to a pooling contract.
Proof. Profits for the single separating contract can be derived the following way. By the
reasoning put forward previously, S = kC − pVC . Therefore, the principal’s profit can be
rewritten as
Πpsep = αC(pWC + (1− p)W
C
A − S) + αF q
∗(pWF + (1− p)W
F
A − S) + αF (1− q
∗)(WFA − kA)
= αC (WC − kC + VC)− αF q
∗
(
W∆F + kC − kA − VC
)
+ αF
(
WFA − kA
)
Profits for the pooling contract are unchanged by the requirement that contracts should
be renegotiation proof, therefore Πpool = αCWC+αFWF +VC−kC as before. Πpsep−Πpool
can be rearranged to
Πpsep −Πpool = αC (WC − kC + VC)− αF q
∗
(
W∆F + kC − kA − VC
)
+ αF
(
WFA − kA
)
− (αCWC + αFWF + VC − kC)
= αF (1− q
∗)
(
W∆F + kC − kA − VC
)
> 0 (8)
The inequality follows from Assumption 1.
Recall that when firm A can commit to break up, it compares the cost of breaking up
with the good type C with the cost of pooling with bad type F . Inequality (8) appears to
imply that firm A only cares whether the cost of pooling with the bad type is positive as it is
similar to the right hand side of condition (1) in Proposition 1. In other words, it appears
firm A no longer cares about the cost of breaking up with type C if it cannot commit
to break up. This surprising result turns out not to be counter-intuitive. When firm A
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cannot commit to breaking up, it offers a single separating contract that is renegotiation
proof, which only partially separates committed agents and free-riders. Firm A knows with
probability αC (1− p
∗) it will break up with the good type, resulting in an efficiency loss
of VC −W
∆
C . However, with probability αF q
∗, it will break up with the bad type, resulting
an efficiency gain of W∆F +kC−VC −kA. The net cost of break up turns out to be negative
αC
(
1− p∗single
)
(VC −W
∆
C )− αF q
∗(W∆F + kC − VC − kA)
= αC
(
VC −W
∆
C
) [
−
kF − kC
VF − VC
+
kA − kC
W∆F − VC
]
< αC
(
VC −W
∆
C
) kA − kF
VF − VC
< 0,
which explains why the principal always prefers the single (partially) separating contract.
Note that the principal prefers the partially separating contract to a pooling contract
whenever it is feasible. However, for some parameter values, a partially separating contract
is not feasible: even if all free-riders were to join the consortium (q = 1), the principal would
prefer to renegotiate the contract, i.e. q∗ > 1. The condition for the partially separating
contract being feasible without commitment is stricter than the condition for the fully
separating being optimal under commitment. In other words, for some parameters, the
principal would prefer a fully separating contract if it could commit, however, it has to
offer a pooling contract because of lack of commitment possibilities.
An empirically testable implication of this is that less commitment power by the princi-
pal makes a breakup clause less likely, since the set of parameters for which breakup occurs
under no commitment is a strict subset of the set of parameters for which breakup occurs
with the possibility of commitment. This also means that with less commitment power,
the project is more likely to be completed.12 The principal’s commitment power may be
due to its market power or a past reputation of committing.
A comparison worthwhile making is the one between a partial separating contract and
doing the project alone, the latter generating profits Πalone = αCW
C
A + αFW
F
A − kA.
Note that with some algebra the partial separating profits can be transformed to Πpsep =
12Of course, this is under the assumption that commitment power is not correlated with the parameters
of the model. If commitment power is correlated with a parameter and this parameter cannot be controlled
for, this correlation will additionally affect the correlation between commitment power and the probability
of completion.
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αC(W
C
A − kC) + αF (W
F
A − kA) + αF q
∗(kA − kC). The profit difference is hence
Πpsep −Πalone = (kA − kC)(αF q
∗ + αC),
which is positive by Assumption 1. Therefore, whenever the renegotiation proof single
separating contract is feasible, the principal will prefer it to conducting research alone.
While the comparison with the menu of separating contracts is somewhat more cumber-
some, it should be clear that there are parameter values for which the partially separating
contract is preferable to the menu of contracts, the pooling contract, and not forming a
consortium. The reason is that the profits in the menu of contracts typically depend on
kF , for the three other setups they do not. Hence, for kF sufficiently large, the menu of
separating contracts is worse than the other setups. Therefore, if a renegotiation proof
single separating contract is feasible, it is preferred to all other setups for kF sufficiently
large.
Note that the usual justification can be given for players playing mixed strategies. One
justification is that we should think of a free-rider playing a mixed strategy as the principal
believing that the free-rider chooses to participate with probability q∗. Another justification
is a standard purification argument (see e.g. Harsanyi (1973) and Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991, pp. 233-234)).13
5 Empirical Implications: The Role of Termination Date
As discussed at the beginning of this paper, many R&D contracts contain termination
dates and there is empirical evidence that terminations indeed happen frequently in R&D
collaboration. In this paper, we have presented an explanation of termination dates based
on adverse selection. There are two alternative theories that could explain breakup of R&D
13Assume e.g. that a free-rider has an additional privately observed random variable ν which is uniformly
distributed on [−ν¯, ν¯]. ν affects the free-rider’s payoff, for example, its setup cost is kF + ν rather than kF .
As ν¯ goes to 0, this model converges to our basic model. However, in this modified model, the free-rider
plays a pure, rather than a mixed strategy. A free-rider with ν ≤ ν∗ participates, a free-rider with ν > ν∗
does not, where the indifferent type ν∗ is given by pVF − kF + ν
∗ = pVC − kC , where p is the completion
probability. Ratio q = (ν¯ − ν∗)/(2ν¯) of free-riders participate, 1 − q do not. The principal can make sure
that ratio q∗ of free-riders participate by choosing p∗∗ such that it satisfies p∗∗VF − kF + ν
∗∗ = p∗∗VC − kC ,
where ν∗∗ is the solution of q∗ = (ν¯ − ν∗∗)/(2ν¯). As ν¯ goes to 0, the principal’s strategy converges to
the strategy of our basic model (p∗∗ → p∗), so does the agent’s strategy, i.e. a free-rider participates with
probability q∗. In other words, the mixed strategy equilibrium described above can be seen as the limiting
case of a slightly perturbed model with a pure strategy equilibrium.
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consortia. First, breakup may occur because the involved parties find out that the project
is non-viable. Second, a breakup date may be the solution of a moral hazard problem: the
principal is worried that the agent may exert insufficient effort and uses a breakup date to
incentivize him to work harder.
Whether the termination date is the result of adverse selection, moral hazard, or non-
viability of the project is an empirically challenging question. It is well known in the
empirical literature that the identification of the different types of informational asymme-
tries is difficult, since information unobservable to one party is typically also unobservable
to the econometrician. Empirical strategies to disentangle adverse selection from moral
hazard typically rely on natural experiments or field experiments, see Lazear (2000) and
Karlan and Zinman (2009).14 There has been recent work that uses additional instruments
to identify different types of informational asymmetries without natural or field experi-
ments (Perrigne and Vuong, 2011). A full-fledged empirical analysis is beyond the scope
of the current paper, but we will describe identification strategies in the spirit of existing
empirically work in other areas of economics.
To make the empirical predictions of the different models as clear as possible, we will
describe results in terms of extremes, as if the models were mutually exclusive and only
one model explained the data. In reality, one would assume that a combination of these
models is the explanation. Then, an empirical goal would be to quantify the importance of
the different effects, rather than test the hypothesis which of the models is the correct one.
This approach has been taken by most of the empirical literature on adverse selection and
moral hazard in other areas. Lazear (2000) finds for the labor contracts he investigates,
e.g. that roughly half of the effect of incentive contracts is due to a selection effect (adverse
selection) and half due to a treatment effect (moral hazard).
To simplify our exposition, we assume that firm and R&D project heterogeneity has
been controlled for. Controlling for heterogeneity is a well-known – but often challenging –
problem in empirical studies and has to be considered along with the specific data set that
is available to the econometrician when applying our suggested identification strategies.
Identification is easiest if one has a natural or a field experiment as in Lazear (2000)
and Karlan and Zinman (2009). The basic idea of such experiments adapted to our setup
is that initially only contracts without a breakup date are offered. Then contracts with a
breakup date are introduced in two phases. In the first phase, it is voluntary to opt-in to
14Lazear (2000) and Karlan and Zinman (2009) use field experiments to distinguish moral hazard and
adverse selection in labor relations and consumer credit markets, respectively.
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a contract with a breakup date. In the second phase, contracts with a breakup date are
mandatory. Depending on whether breakup dates are used to deal with adverse selection or
moral hazard or whether breakup is the result of the partners finding out that the project
is non-viable, one will observe different outcomes in the different phases, e.g. in terms of
the realized value of the project. Since natural or field experiments can be expected to be
rare for R&D contracts, we do not describe them here, but refer the reader to Appendix C.
For a more detailed description of the theory of breakup dates which serve to mitigate
moral hazard, see Appendix D. Appendix E describes a model in which break up occurs
because the research partners find out that the project is non-viable.
Next, we show that identification is still possible using our theory without natural or
field experiments. We will describe three such identification strategies in the following.
The first distinguishes between adverse selection and moral hazard on one hand and non-
viability on the other hand by using data on the time until discovery. The second relies
on proxies for setup costs to distinguish the effects of adverse selection, moral hazard, and
non-viability. The third uses a proxy for effort to distinguish the three effects.
Hazard Rate of Discovery Given observations of the time until discovery, it is well
known in the econometric literature how to estimate the hazard rate of discovery as a
function of duration (see e.g. van den Berg (2001)). Given such an estimate of how the
discovery rate changes over time, we can distinguish a model of a non-viable project and
adverse selection.
Appendix E describes a model in which the two firms find out that the project is
non-viable after some time. If break up is due to non-viability, the empirically observed
discovery rate should be decreasing over time if there is a breakup date. This is because
the more time passes without discovery, the more likely it is that the project is not viable
(lower discovery rate). The discovery rate should be constant if there is no breakup date.
The reason is that the R&D partners do not need to specify a breakup date if they are
sure that the project is viable. Hence, as time passes without discovery, the posterior
probability of the project being viable does not change and the discovery rate does not
change either. See Appendix E for formal results.
If break up is due to adverse selection (or moral hazard), the hazard rate of discovery
should be constant both for contracts with and without a breakup date. As shown in a
previous version of this paper with an alternative specification of adverse selection in which
screening occurs also with respect to the discovery rate, one should observe the opposite
23
of what is observed with non-viability: for contracts with a breakup date (separating
contracts) one should observe a constant discovery rate, whereas for contracts without
a breakup date (pooling contracts) one should observe a decreasing discovery rate. The
reason is that with a separating contract only one type of agent participates and only the
constant hazard rate of this type is empirically observed. For a pooling contract, there are
several types of agents; the more time passes without discovery, the more likely that the
agent has a low discovery rate.
The above reasoning is based on the assumption of an exponential distribution of dis-
coveries. While this is a widely used assumption in the applied theory literature on R&D,
one can also think of setups with non-exponential distributions. In this case, the argument
is slightly more involved, but similar. Instead of a constant versus decreasing discovery
rate, one has to consider an approach similar to the differences in differences technique.15
Setup Cost Assume that a proxy for the agent’s setup cost k is observable ex post, but it
is not possible to contract on this proxy. One possible proxy for setup costs is the liquidity
of a firm (or deep pockets): a low liquidity does not allow for high initial setup costs.
In the following we will argue that in the setup without commitment the following
identification strategy can be used to distinguish adverse selection from moral hazard if
free-riders are sufficiently rare (αF < 1/2). If one observes the setup costs k ex post,
one should see that for contracts without a breakup date (pooling contracts) the variance
of k is larger than for contracts with a breakup date (partially separating contracts) if
adverse selection is the explanation. If moral hazard rather than adverse selection is the
explanation, it should be the other way around: the variance should be larger for contracts
with a breakup date.
First, observe that in the adverse selection with no commitment case (Section 4), the
choice of a pooling versus a partially separating contract is independent of kF and kC , since
the principal will always choose a partially separating contract over a pooling contract as
long as it is feasible. A partially pooling contract is feasible if
αC(VC −W
∆
C )
αF (W
∆
F − VC)
=: q∗ ≤ 1,
15In case of non-viability, the derivative of the discovery rate with respect to time should be smaller with
rather than without a breakup date. In case of adverse selection, the derivative should be smaller without
rather than with a breakup date. For the special case of exponential distributions considered here, the
larger derivative is zero and the smaller derivative is negative.
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which is independent of kF and kC . Therefore, there is no selection effect for kF and
kC for potential research partners in submarkets in which pooling contracts are preferred
versus submarkets in which partially separating contracts are preferred.16 However, there
is a selection effect for k when considering actual (rather than potential) research partners
with a partially separating contract,17 since free-riders are less likely to be in the sample for
this type of contract. There is no selection effect when considering actual research partners
with a pooling contract.
Therefore, for a pooling contract (i.e. no breakup date) the agent has the setup cost kC
with probability αC and the cost kF with probability αF . By the definition of the variance
of a binary distribution, the variance of k is
Varadverse selectionno breakup [k] = αFαC(kF − kC)
2.
For a partially separating contract (i.e. with a breakup date), the probability of kF is
q∗αF /(q
∗αF + αC) and of kC it is αC/(q
∗αF + αC) due to the selection effect, where q
∗
is the free-rider’s probability of participating as defined in Proposition 5. Therefore, the
variance is
Varadverse selectionbreakup [k] =
q∗αFαC
(q∗αF + αC)2
(kF − kC)
2
Denote the ratio of variances as a function of q∗ as
X(q∗) :=
Varadverse selectionno breakup [k]
Varadverse selectionbreakup [k]
=
(αF q
∗ + αC)
2
q∗
.
The derivative of X is
X ′ (q∗) =
αF q
∗ + αC
q∗2
αF
[
q∗ −
1− αF
αF
]
.
Free-riders being sufficiently rare (αF < 1/2) implies (1 − αF )/αF > 1, which in turn
implies q∗ − (1 − αF )/αF < 0 and hence X
′ (q∗) < 0 for all q∗. Since X(1) = 1 and
16This is under the assumption that these parameters are either uncorrelated with the parameters for
which there is a selection effect or that the correlated parameters can be controlled for.
17Comparing contracts with and without breakup dates (that is partially separating and pooling con-
tracts) is a simplified version of a comparison of contracts with short versus long times until a breakup.
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X ′ (q∗) < 0, X(q∗) > 1 for all q∗, which means
Varadverse selectionno breakup [k] > Var
adverse selection
breakup [k] ,
for all q∗.18
For moral hazard a similar reasoning about the selection effect of k for potential research
partners can be made as for adverse selection. A high effort inducing mixed strategy
contract is feasible if
VC −W
∆
C
W∆F −W
∆
C
=: q∗m ≤ 1,
which is independent of kF and kC (see Appendix D for the derivation of q
∗
m). Hence, there
is no selection effect for kF and kC for potential research partners in submarkets in which
low effort contracts (no breakup date) are preferred versus submarkets in which high effort
contracts (breakup date) are preferred.
Since for moral hazard, all agents are ex ante identical, a contract without a breakup
date will induce all agents to incur the same low effort. Therefore, all agents will have the
same setup costs kF and variance is Var
moral hazard
no breakup [k] = 0 in our simple binary distribu-
tion setup. A renegotiation proof contract with a breakup date will cause the agents to
randomize between exerting effort and not, hence the variance of k is Varmoral hazardbreakup [k] =
q∗m(1 − q
∗
m)(kF − kC)
2 > 0, where q∗m ∈ (0, 1) is the probability of the agent exerting low
effort in the agent’s mixed strategy. Therefore, for moral hazard, we have
Varmoral hazardno breakup [k] < Var
moral hazard
breakup [k] ,
i.e. the opposite ordering as for adverse selection.
In case of non-viability the variance in setup costs should be the same for contracts
with and without a breakup date. In our simple setup, the variance is 0, if all sources of
heterogeneity are controlled for.
Note that for the sake of notational simplicity, we stated our results under the assump-
tion that our model is the sole reason of the variance of k. However, it is straight-forward
to extend these results to a setup in which there is an additional error term. For an addi-
tive error term , observed setup costs would be k+  and variance Var[k] +Var[] and the
above reasoning would go through with minor modifications.
18This inequality can also hold if αF > 1/2 provided that q
∗ is sufficiently small, since limq∗→0X(q
∗) =∞.
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Proxy of Effort Observable Assume that a proxy for effort is observable ex post, but
not contractible. An example in the labor literature is Malmendier and Tate (2009), who
show that after a CEO achieves superstar status, the performance of his firms becomes
worse, but the ranking of the CEO in golf tournaments and the probability of him writing
an autobiography increase, these being interpreted as a proxy for (the lack of) effort. Here,
a similar reasoning holds as with setup costs.
Consider the case in which commitment to breakup is possible. If adverse selection is the
explanation, there should be variance in effort for contracts without a breakup date (pooling
contracts) and no variance in effort for contracts with a breakup date (separating contract).
The reason is that in a separating contract, only committed types participate, hence there
is no heterogeneity and no variance. In a pooling contract, both types participate, hence
heterogeneity and variance. If moral hazard is the explanation, there should be no variance
in effort for both contracts without (low effort inducing contracts) and with (high effort
inducing contracts) a breakup date. The reason is that with moral hazard, agents are ex
ante identical. For a contract with a breakup date, all agents exert the same level of (high)
effort. For a contract without a breakup date, all exert the same low level of effort.
Both adverse selection and moral hazard imply that average effort should be higher
with the contract with a breakup date. If non-viability is the explanation, then effort
should be the same irrespective of whether there is a breakup date.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
In contrast to the previous literature on R&D contracts that focuses on payment schemes,
our paper is the first to model an essential clause in R&D collaboration agreements — the
breakup date — as a screening device. We identify the conditions under which a breakup
rule becomes necessary. In essence, breakup is unavoidable if the potential partners’ incen-
tives are misaligned — the agent who has high value of the project is also less attractive
for the principal. In our setup this also means that a high value of the project is linked to
a high setup cost. This turns out to be particularly relevant in the biotech-pharmaceutical
industry, which not only shows high popularity of R&D collaboration through contractual
arrangements, but also has high occurrence of breakups. In contrast to the conventional
wisdom that breakup is a loss control measure, we show that firms can use a breakup clause
to screen potential partners. Breakup clauses may be attractive for the principal even if
commitment to an (ex post inefficient) breakup date is not possible.
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Compared with the large literature on optimal contracts under asymmetric informa-
tion,19 the theoretical analyses on the role of asymmetric information in R&D contracts
are rather sparse, most of them focusing on the moral hazard problem within research joint
ventures or under cross licensing agreements. A number of papers, however, have shown
that first-best can still be implemented in the presence of moral hazard, see e.g. Choi
(1992), Morasch (1995), and Pastor and Sandonis (2002).20 Only a few papers focus on
the adverse selection problem. Bhattacharya, Glazer, and Sappington (1992) and Gandal
and Scotchmer (1993) consider adverse selection in R&D research joint ventures and show
how payment schemes can be used to implement first-best in their setups. Our paper dif-
fers from theirs by providing insights on using breakup dates to screen R&D partners, an
outcome that cannot be achieved through payment schemes alone.
There is very little research focusing on breakup in R&D collaborations. In fact, the
theoretical literature has largely ignored the breakup clause in R&D contracts until re-
cently.21 Two notable exceptions are Lerner and Malmendier (2010) and Bonatti and
Ho¨rner (2011). Lerner and Malmendier (2010) argue that the right of termination when
coupled with claims on a broader intellectual property right can help reduce or eliminate
the moral hazard problem among the agents’ research when using the principal’s funding.
Unlike our paper, they do not allow for endogenous breakup timing. Bonatti and Ho¨rner’s
(2011) work on team collaboration touches breakup time in a wider sense, but they deal
with a very different question. They provide an explanation for breakup under the as-
sumption that there is uncertainty about the feasibility of the project and members of a
collaborating team can commit ex ante to an ex post inefficient deadline. Our analysis is
complementary to Bonatti and Ho¨rner’s by showing the optimality of deadlines even when
there is no belief updating and even if commitment to a deadline (or breakup date) is not
possible.
Nevertheless, our paper is just a first step towards a better understanding of breakup
clauses in R&D contracts. In reality, the reasons for breakup could vary under different
conditions, so our theory by no means is an all-inclusive explanation. Given adverse selec-
tion, moral hazard, and non-viability being the three major reasons for including a breakup
19See e.g. the seminal paper by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for a recent
overview of the literature.
20An exception is Brocas (2004), who focuses on the second best contract and shows the optimal effort
level may be distorted both upward and downward.
21Cabral (2000) shows the R&D collaboration breakup can facilitate tacit collusion among firms facing
product market competition.
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date, we propose several identification strategies in Section 5. Finally, because each side is
very serious about negotiating a termination clause, an alternative approach is to model
breakup as a signaling device by a privately informed principal. The principal may want to
use a short breakup date to signal that he is committed to the project, that the project is
feasible in a relatively short period of time, or that the principal is experienced in the area
of research. A model of a contract that serves both to screen the agent and to signal the
principal’s type is a technically challenging, yet potentially rewarding, avenue for further
research.22
References
[1] Besanko, D. and Wu. J. (2013), ”The Impact of Market Structure and Learning on
the Tradeoff between R&D Competition and Cooperation.” Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics, Vol. 61, Issue 1, pp. 166-201
[2] Bester, H. and Strausz, R. (2001), ”Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the
Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case.” Econometrica, 69: 1077–1098.
[3] Bhattacharya, S., J. Glazer, and M. Sappington, (1992) ”Licensing and the Sharing
of Knowledge in Research Joint Ventures,” Journal of Economic Theory, 56, 43-69.
[4] Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont (2005) Contract Theory. The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
[5] Bonatti, A. and J. Ho¨rner (2011) ”Collaborating.” American Economic Review.
[6] Branstetter, L. G. and M. Sakakibara (2002) ”When Do Research Consortia Work
Well and Why? Evidence from Japanese Panel Data.” American Economic Review,
Vol. 92, No. 1, pp. 143-159
[7] Brocas, I. (2004) ”Optimal Regulation of Cooperative R&D under Incomplete Infor-
mation.” Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume LII No.1 81-119.
22See Myerson (1983) and the subsequent literature for a treatment of the informed principal’s mechanism
design problem. One could think e.g. of the agent having private information whether he is committed or
a free-rider, whereas the principal has private information whether the project is easy or difficult (a high
or a low discovery rate). By the inscrutability principle (see Myerson (1983)), the contract offered by the
principal should signal his type. Revelation of both the principal’s and the agent’s type and the following
contractual agreement could serve as a model of negotiations between the involved parties.
29
[8] Cabral, L. (2000) ”R&D Cooperation and Product Market Competition.” Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization 18, 1033-1047.
[9] Choi, J.P. (1992) ”Cooperative R&D with Moral Hazard.” Economic Letters, 39,
485-491.
[10] D’Aspremont, C. and A. Jacquemin. (1988). ”Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D
in Duopoly with Spillovers, ” American Economic Review, 78, No.5. 1133-1137.
[11] Danzon, P.M., S. Nicholson, and N.S. Pereira. (2005). ”Productivity in
pharmaceutical-biotechnology R&D: the role of experience and alliances,” Journal
of Health Economics, 24, 317-339.
[12] Esty, B. C. and P. Ghemawat, (2002) ”Airbus vs. Boeing in Superjumbos: A Case of
Failed Preemption” (February 2002). HBS Strategy Unit Working Paper No. 02-061
[13] Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole (1991). Game Theory, MIT Press.
[14] Gandal, N. and S. Scotchmer (1993), ”Coordinating Research Through Research Joint
Ventures, ” Journal of Public Economics, 51 173-193.
[15] Gilson, R. J. (1999). ”The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete.” N.Y.U.L. Rev., 74, 575.
[16] Hagedoorn, J. (2002). ”Inter-firm R&D partnerships: an overview of major trends and
patterns since 1960,” Research Policy, 31, 477-492.
[17] Hagedoorn, J. and G. Hesen (2007), ”Contract Law and the Governance of Inter-Firm
Technology Partnerships - An Analysis of Different Modes of Partnering and Their
Contractual Implications.” Journal of Management Studies, 44:3 pp342-366.
[18] Hansen, Z. K., (2003), ”The Contractual Structure and Innovative Effects of
Pharmaceutical-Biotechnology R&D Collaborations” in Advances in the Study of En-
trepreneurship, Innovation and Economic Growth, Vol.14: ”Issues in Entrepreneur-
ship: Contracts, Corporate Characteristics, and Country Differences,” Gary D.
Libecap ed., JAI Press.
[19] Harsanyi, J.C. (1973). ”Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for
mixed-strategy equilibrium points. Int. J. Game Theory 2, pp. 1-23.
30
[20] Kale P, Dyer J.H., Singh H. (2002) ”Alliance Capability, Stock Market Response, and
Long-Term Alliance Success: The Role of the Alliance Function.” Strategic Manage-
ment Journal 23,8: 747-767
[21] Kamien, M., E. Muller, and I. Zang. (1992). ”Research Joint Ventures and R&D
Cartels.” American Economic Review, 82, No. 5, 1293-1306.
[22] Karlan, D., & Zinman, J. (2009). ”Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information
Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment.” Econometrica, 77(6), 1993-
2008.
[23] Katz, M. (1986). ”An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development,” Rand
Journal of Economics, Vol. 17 No.4, 527-543.
[24] Krishna, V. (2009). Auction Theory. Academic press.
[25] Kogut, B. (1989). ”The Stability of Joint Ventures: Reciprocity and Competitive
Rivalry.” Journal of Industrial Economics 38, 183–198.
[26] Lacetera, N. (2009). ”Different Missions and Commitment Power in R&D Organiza-
tions: Theory and Evidence on Industry-University Alliances.” Organization Science
Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 565-582.
[27] Lazear, E. (2000). ”Performance Pay and Productivity.” American Economic Review,
90(5), 1346-1361.
[28] Lerner, J. and U. Malmendier (2005) ”Contractibility and the Design of Research
Agreements.” NBER Working Paper No. 11292
[29] Lerner, J. and U. Malmendier (2010) ”Contractibility and the Design of Research
Agreements” American Economic Review, Vol 100(1), 214-246.
[30] Mahnke, V. and M. L. Overby (2008). ”Failure Sources in R&D Consortia: the Case
of Mobile Service Development.” International Journal of Technology Management,
Vol. 44, Nos 1/2, 160-178.
[31] Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2009). ”Superstar CEOs.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 124(4), 1593-1638.
31
[32] Morasch, K., (1995). ”Moral Hazard and Optimal Contract form for R&D Coopera-
tion.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 28, 63-78.
[33] Mussa, M., and S. Rosen. (1978). ”Monopoly and Product Quality.” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 18: 301-317.
[34] Myerson, R. B. (1983). ”Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal.” Econometrica,
1767-1797.
[35] Narula, R. and J. Hagedoorn. (1999) ”Innovating through Strategic Alliances: Moving
towards International Partnerships and Contractual Agreements.” Technovation 19,
283-294.
[36] Pastor, M. and J. Sandonis. (2002) ”Research Joint Ventures vs. Cross Licensing
Agreements: an Agency Approach.” International Journal of Industrial Organization,
20, 215-249.
[37] Perrigne, I., & Vuong, Q. (2011). ”Nonparametric Identification of a Contract Model
with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.” Econometrica, 79(5), 1499-1539.
[38] Reuer, J. and M. Zollo (2005), ”Termination Outcomes of Research Alliances.” Re-
search Policy, 34, 101-115.
[39] Ryall, M. and R. C. Sampson (2009), ”Formal Contracts in the Presence of Rela-
tional Enforcement Mechanisms: Evidence from Technology Development Projects.”
Management Science, Vol. 55, No. 6, pp. 906-925.
[40] van den Berg, G. J. (2001): “Duration Models: Specification, Identification, and
Multiple Durations,” in Handbook of Econometrics, Vol.5, ed. by J. J. Heckman, and
E. Leamer, pp. 3381-3460. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
[41] Vohra, R.V. (2005) Advanced Mathematical Economics. Routledge: London and New
York.
32
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We can rewrite the objective function (2) as
αCWA + αFW
F
A −
{
min
SC ,pC ,SF ,pF
αCW
∆
C pC + αCSC + αFW
∆
F pF + αFSF
}
Because αCWA + αFW
F
A is a constant, we focus on the following linear programming
problem
γP = min
SC ,pC ,SF ,pF
αCW
∆
C pC + αCSC + αFW
∆
F pF + αFSF
s.t. (3) – (7)
The dual of this problem is
γD = max kCy1 + kF y2 − y5 − y6
s.t.y1 + y3 − y4 = αC (9)
y2 − y3 + y4 = αF (10)
VCy1 + VCy3 − VF y4 − y5 ≤ αCW
∆
C (11)
VF y2 − VCy3 + VF y4 − y6 ≤ αFW
∆
F (12)
y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6 ≥ 0
(9) and (10) imply
y1 + y2 = αC + αF = 1⇒ y2 = 1− y1
Furthermore, we must have y5 = 0, otherwise, by the complementary slackness theorem
(see Theorem 4.10 in Vohra (2005)), we must have pC = 1, which leads to a contradiction
because we then have pF > pC = 1.
Substituting y2 = 1−y1, y4 = y1+y3−αC and y5 = 0 into (11) and (12) and simplifying
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the expressions, we have
y1 ≥ αC
VF −W
∆
C
VF − VC
− y3
y6 ≥ αF
(
VF −W
∆
F
)
+ (VF − VC) y3.
Note that the objective function in the dual becomes
γD = kF − (kF − kC) y1 − y6
≤ kF − (kF − kC)
(
αC
VF −W
∆
C
VF − VC
− y3
)
−
[
αF
(
VF −W
∆
F
)
+ (VF − VC) y3
]
≤ kF − (kF − kC)αC
VF −W
∆
C
VF − VC
− αF
(
VF −W
∆
F
)
.
The last inequality follows from VF − VC > kF − kC as implied by Condition 1. By the
Weak Duality Theorem (see Vohra (2005)), we must have γD ≤ γP , which implies the
principal’s optimal profit, Πsep, must satisfy
Πsep ≤ αCW
C
A + αFW
F
A −
[
kF − (kF − kC)αC
VF −W
∆
C
VF − VC
− αF
(
VF −W
∆
F
)]
.
From Proposition 1, we have
Πsingle = αC(WC +W
∆
C − kC + (VC −W
∆
C )
kF − kC
VF − VC
) + αF (W
F
A − kA).
Hence
Πsingle −Πsep ≥ αF (kF − kA)− αF
(
VF −W
∆
F
)
> 0,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 1. This completes the proof.
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B Multidimensional Analysis
Our analysis reflects the general notion in contract theory that clauses in contracts are
used to solve a problem stemming from a misalignment of incentives between the principal
and the agent. Here the misalignment is due to the fact that cooperation with a committed
agent is more attractive for the principal (Assumption 1), but a free rider is more inclined
to cooperate than a committed agent (Condition 1). An implication of Assumption 1
and Condition 1 is that a single-crossing condition holds: for a probability of completion
p ≥ p∗single, the private benefits of the free-rider are larger than those of the committed
agent; for p ≤ p∗single, the opposite holds. This also means that the committed agent has
a lower value of participating in the project (VC < VF ) and a lower opportunity cost
(kC < kF ). This may be seen as a special case of the following two-dimensional setup:
the agent may have high or low opportunity costs kH > kL, and may be a free-rider or a
committed agent with VC < VF . Our one dimensional setup can be viewed as considering
two extremes: when Condition 1 does not hold (as analyzed in Proposition 1) V and k are
perfectly negatively correlated (the two possible types are (VC , kH) and (VF , kL)); when
Condition 1 does hold (as analyzed in the rest of the paper) V and k are perfectly positively
correlated (the two possible types are (VC , kL) and (VF , kH)). One may wonder how results
carry over to a setup beyond the extremes, when correlation is neither −1 nor +1. This
requires us to consider a multidimensional screening setup. Given that multidimensional
screening is known to be a very difficult and tedious problem, we provide numerical results
that show that breakup may be necessary even if V and k are negatively, but not perfectly,
correlated.
We spell out the details of the two-dimensional setup in the following. One dimension
is whether the agent is a free-rider or a committed type (F/C) and the other whether he
has a high or a low outside option (H/L). If the agent’s type is (i, j) ∈ {F,C} × {H,L},
the agent’s net present value of completing the project is Vi = (λT vi− εi)/(r+ λT ) and its
outside option kj . The principal’s payoff is Wi = (λTwi − 1)/(r + λT ) when cooperating
and W jA = (λw
j
A − 1)/(r + λ) when conducting the research alone. Note that firm A’s
payoff from R&D collaboration depends on whether B is of type C or type F, because a
committed type contributes to the project and increases its value. On the other hand,
firm A’s payoff from carrying out the research alone depends on firm B’s outside option: a
free-rider has a competing product, making the development alone may lead to a product
which faces tough competition, such as it is the case of Airbus’s superjumbo jet competing
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with Boeing’s 747 or dreamliner.
Denote the probability of type ij as αij . Let pij and Sij be the probability of completion
and the transfer designed for type ij. The principal’s profit is W jA − kA when conducting
the research alone, and pijWi + (1− pij)W
j
A − Sij when cooperating with type ij.
Firm A can offer a menu of contracts which induces types (i, j) ∈ P ⊂ {F,C}×{H,L}
to participate. Type ij gets the up-front payment Sij and the probability of completion
pij. The four individual rationality constraints are U
∗
ij ≥ 0 for all (i, j) ∈ {F,C} × {H,L},
where U∗ij = Uij(Sij , pij) if (i, j) ∈ P and U
∗
ij = 0 else. The twelve incentive compatibility
constraints are U∗ij ≥ Uij(Si′j′ , pi′j′) for all (i, j) ∈ {F,C}×{H,L} and (i
′, j′) ∈ P , (i′, j′) 6=
(i, j).
A naive direct approach would be to check all combinations of the twelve constraints
being binding or not (i.e. 216 combinations) and do this procedure for all 15 non-empty
subsets P of the type space. While the computational burden could be somewhat reduced
by a more sophisticated approach, it would still be too much. We therefore solve the
problem numerically for different parameter values.
We take as initial values WC = 16, VC = 10, W
L
A = 17, kL = 8, WF = 8, VF = 16,
kH = 12, W
H
A = 32, kA = 0. We compute the optimal contract for different values of
the probability of the agent being committed αC and the affiliation parameter φ, which
determines the probabilities of types αLC = αCφ, αHF = (1 − αC)φ, αHC = αC(1 − φ),
and αLF = (1− αC)(1− φ). The random variables V and k are affiliated if
αFHαCL ≥ αCHαFL
see e.g. Krishna (2009, Appendix D). For our specification, this condition is equivalent to
φ ≥ 12 . For φ <
1
2 , they are anti-affiliated. Affiliation implies correlation, since
ρ = Corr(V, k) = 2
(
φ−
1
2
)√
αC(1− αC)
αH(1− αH)
,
where αH = αC(1 − φ) + (1 − αC)φ is the unconditional probability of kH . V and k are
positively correlated (ρ > 0) if φ > 12 and negatively correlated if φ <
1
2 . The two cases
analyzed in the main text are perfect positive correlation (φ = 1 which implies ρ = 1) and
perfect negative correlation (φ = 0 which implies ρ = −1).
We solve the linear programming problem numerically for each of the possible subsets P ,
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compute the optimal contract, and check whether the optimal contract includes a breakup
date. We repeat this procedure for each value of (αC , φ) on a 100×100 grid on [0, 1]× [0, 1].
This procedure in turn we repeat for different initial parameter values. Results are reported
in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 presents the optimal contract for different parameter values.
The case with initial parameters is represented in the lower right of Figure 2, where area
(i) indicates the optimal contract induces types {CL,FL} to participate while area (ii)
indicates the optimal contract induces types {CL,FL,HF} . Figure 2 shows that for the
majority of values of αC ∈ [0, 1] and φ ∈ [0, 1], the principal collaborates with firms having
low outside option only unless the principal’s payoff from collaboration or from conducting
research alone are high enough, which are illustrated in cases (d) and (g). Figure 3 shows
in which regions breakup is necessary. As shown in panels (d), (g), and (i) of Figure 3,
breakup is more likely to occur in general if αC and φ are large. However, for αC sufficiently
close to one, the principal prefers to let type FH enter and to drop the breakup clause.
Figure 3 also shows that perfect positive correlation between V and k is not necessary
to have a breakup date. Breakup may even occur if correlation is (imperfectly) negative
(φ ∈ (0, 12)), i.e. incentives are imperfectly aligned.
C Identification with Natural or Field Experiment
First, we explain how a natural experiment (similar to the one described by Lazear (2000)
for labor contracts) would distinguish the role of termination date as the result of adverse
selection or moral hazard. Suppose the principal is a firm that conducts many R&D
collaborations with different firms. Assume that initially, only contracts without breakup
dates are offered. This may be because a firm (that can be seen as the principal) has a
general policy of not including breakup dates in contracts.23 As Lazear (2000) suggests,
this initial contract may not be optimal.24
The experiment is divided into two stages. At the first stage, cooperation partners are
23Lacetera (2009) observes that when an R&D collaboration involves partnering with academic institu-
tions, the contract offered by the industry firm often does not include a termination date, although this
lack of termination date may be endogenous. For the experiment we described below, we assume the lack
of breakup dates is exogenous. Alternatively, there may be legal restrictions, such as the termination clause
that specifies the breakup dates is deemed unenforceable by courts. For example, an Ontario court in
Canada recently ruled that the termination clause in an employment contract in Wright v. The Young and
Rubicam Group of Companies is unenforceable.
24It may be that the initial contract was optimal at some point in the past, but circumstances changed
and the principal has not adapted to the change yet.
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Figure 2: Optimal contract for different parameter values and different values φ ∈ (0, 1)
and αC ∈ (0, 1). Initial parameter set WC = 16, VC = 10, W
L
A = 17, kL = 8, WF = 8,
VF = 16, kH = 12, W
H
A = 32, kA = 0. Probabilities of types αCL = αCφ, αFH = (1−αC)φ,
αCH = αC(1− φ), and αFL = (1− αC)(1 − φ). In region (i) the optimal contract induces
types {CL,FL} to participate, in region (ii) types {FH,FL,CL}.
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Figure 3: Regions in which breakup is necessary for different parameter values and different
values φ ∈ (0, 1) and αC ∈ (0, 1). Initial parameter set WC = 16, VC = 10, W
L
A = 17,
kL = 8, WF = 8, VF = 16, kH = 12, W
H
A = 32, kA = 0. Probabilities of types αCL = αCφ,
αFH = (1− αC)φ, αCH = αC(1− φ), and αFL = (1− αC)(1 − φ).
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offered the possibility to opt into a contract with a breakup date. Partners that do not
wish to have a breakup date can keep their initial contract. Call partners that opt into the
new contract type 1 firms and firms that stay in the initial contractual arrangement type
0 firms. Types 1 and 0 are the committed and the free-rider types when adverse selection
is the underlying reason as our theory models. Alternatively, if the underlying reason is
moral hazard, then type 1 and 0 are the non-shirking and shirking firms respectively.
At the second stage, the contract with a breakup date is compulsory for all partners.
To keep the analogy to Lazear’s experiment, assume that the firms that did not wish to
opt into the new contract in the first stage are paid enough to be willing to participate.
The reasoning is similar, but slightly different if they choose not to cooperate any more at
the second stage.
We will describe the empirical observations that one should make given the different
theories.
Adverse Selection In case of adverse selection type 1 firms are the committed types that
self-select into the new contract. Type 0 firms are free-riders. One observes the outcomes
of the R&D cooperations with the partners in the first stage. For type 1 firms, the value
of the discovery of the project is higher on average than for type 0 firms. (Particularly
in our model, collaboration with a type 1 firm increases the joint value of the project but
collaboration with a type 0 firm decreases the joint value of the project.) Controlling for
other factors that affect the value of the project, if the econometrician observes the values
of discovery in past cooperations with the same partners, the value of discovery changes
neither for types 1 nor 0, it is only a selection effect. In the second stage, when contracts
with breakup dates are compulsory, the value of discovery is still unchanged for both types
1 and types 0, since in an adverse selection setup only the inherent type of the agent, which
does not change in both stages, affects output.
Moral Hazard If moral hazard is the explanation and adverse selection plays no – or only
a negligible role – the following should be observed. Assume that at the first stage, the new
contract is such that the partners are just indifferent between the new and the old contract
in case there is no heterogeneity between partners. Then partners randomize whether to
accept the new contract or not. Alternatively, there might be some small (almost negligible)
heterogeneity, so that partners self-select according to small type differences (purification
argument). The breakup date gives type 1 firms an incentive to exert effort, whereas type
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0 firms do not have an incentive to exert effort. Therefore, the value of discovery for type
1 firms is larger than at the initial stage, whereas for type 0 firms it remains the same. At
the second stage, after the new contract becomes compulsory for both types, the value of
discovery stays the same for type 1 firms as in the first stage, since they still have the same
incentives to exert effort. For type 0 firms, however, there is a change, since now they face
the same contract as type 1 firms and have the same incentives for effort. Therefore, the
realized value of the project increases to the level of the value for type 1 firms. (Or slightly
below their average value, if there is a small selection effect.) See Appendix D for a formal
treatment of moral hazard in our context.
Non-viability An alternative explanation is that the two firms involved in the coop-
eration find out that the cooperation is not fruitful, either because no discovery is to be
expected in general or because cooperation between the two parties does not work. For this
explanation, the changes of contracts will not have an effect on the value of discovery.25
See Appendix E for a formal treatment of a model of a potentially non-viable project.
Table 1 summarizes the identification strategy through the two-stage experiment dis-
cussed above. Alternatively, one can also think of the following natural experiment –
instead of two stages, there are a control group and two treatment groups. The partners
in the control group only are offered a contract without a breakup date, partners in the
first treatment group (corresponds to first stage) can choose between a breakup date and
no breakup date, partners in the second treatment group (corresponding to the second
stage) have to accept a contract with a breakup date. Such an experiment is less informa-
tive, since in the second treatment group one cannot distinguish who would have chosen
a contract with a breakup date if it were voluntary. But the theories are still empirically
distinguishable: in case of adverse selection, the average value of the discovery is the same
for the two treatment groups and lower for the control group. Further, in the first treat-
ment group, the average value is higher for type 1 than 0. In case of moral hazard, the
average value should be higher for the first treatment group than in the control group. The
average value should be even higher for the second treatment group. Types 1 in the first
treatment group should have the same average value as partners in the second treatment
group. For the non-viability, there should be no difference between treatment and control
25A second hypothesis that would generate the same empirical predictions is that the principal uses the
breakup date to signal his type. For this hypothesis, the breakup date has no effect on the value of discovery
either.
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first step second step
type type
hypothesis 1 0 1 0
adverse selection + 0 + 0
moral hazard + 0 + +
non-viable project 0 0 0 0
Table 1: Effects on the value of the project compared to original outcome (or: compared
to control group).
groups.
D Moral Hazard
It is well known in the contract theory literature that hidden action and hidden information
are very similar. The same (or a similar) incentive scheme can both serve to screen out
undesired types and to induce agents to exert effort.
A logic very similar to our adverse selection setup can be applied to derive results for
moral hazard. In the following we describe a setup in which a breakup date in a contract
is used to solve a moral hazard problem. For the sake of simplicity and comparability, we
keep this setup as similar as possible to the adverse selection setup in the main text. In
particular, assume the agent can decide whether to put in effort (which means he becomes
committed, C) or not to put in effort (i.e. he becomes a free-rider, F ). The agent makes
the decision once at the beginning after the contract was signed and cannot change the
decision later on. Similarly to before, denote net present values of discovery by VC , WC ,
W∆C , W
C
A and setup costs by kC in case the agent decided to exert effort. In case of no
effort, let these values be denoted by VC , WC , W
∆
C , W
C
A , kF .
If the agent exerts effort i = C,F , the principal’s profit is pWi + (1 − p)W
C
A − S and
the agent’s utility pVk − ki + S, where p is the probability of completing the project and
S the transfer to the agent. There are two types of contracts: high-effort contracts that
induce the agent to exert effort and low effort contracts which induce the agent to exert
low effort. Note that only one contract is needed, since there is only one (ex ante) type of
agent. Further, a low effort contract may be profitable if the cost of inducing effort is too
high.
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For the high effort contract, the principal’s maximization problem is
max
p,S
pWC + (1− p)W
C
A − S
s.t. S + pVC − kC ≥ S + pVF − kF
S + pVC − kC ≥ 0
where the first constraint makes sure that the agent exerts effort (incentive compatibility)
and the second makes sure he is willing to participate (individual rationality). Solving the
incentive compatibility constraint for p yields
p∗ =
kF − kC
VF − VC
.
Using p∗ in the individual rationality constraint yields
S∗ = −p∗VC + kC .
For the low incentive contract, the maximization problem is
max
p,S
pWF + (1− p)W
F
A − S
s.t. S + pVF − kF ≥ 0.
Note that there is no incentive compatibility constraint in this case, since the principal
is not trying to induce the agent to exert effort. Choosing S such that the individual
rationality constraint is just binding, S = kF − pVF , and plugging this into the principal’s
profit function yields WFA − p(W
∆
F − VF )− kF . Since profits are linear in p, the principal’s
maximization problem has a bang-bang solution: p = 1 ifW∆F > VF and p = 0 ifW
∆
F < VF .
Under Assumption 1, the latter is the case and breakup occurs immediately.
The comparison of profits under high effort and low effort
WCA + p
∗(VC −W
∆
C )− kC > W
F
A − kF
can be rearranged to
(1− p∗)(VC −W
∆
C ) < (WC + VC − kC)− (W
F
A − kF ).
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The left hand side is the efficiency loss due to early breakup and the right hand side is the
efficiency gain because of high effort. If the latter is larger, a breakup clause is profitable.
No Commitment We can make a similar reasoning as for adverse selection when con-
sidering the additional constraint that contracts have to be renegotiation proof.
One can make a similar argument as before that the standard high effort contract is
not renegotiation proof. Consider the breakup date, at which the agent’s setup costs kC
are already sunk. This means that the principal’s maximization problem at the breakup
date is
max
p,S
pWC + (1− p)W
C
A − S
s.t. S + pVC ≥ 0,
where p is the probability of completing the project after the breakup date given by the
contract and S are additional transfers. Setting the agent indifferent (S = −pVC), the
principal’s profit is pWC + (1 − p)W
C
A + pVC = W
C
A + p(VC −W
∆
C ). By Assumption 1,
profits are increasing in p, i.e. the principal would prefer renegotiating the contract once
breakup is due. Therefore, the threat of breakup is not credible at the initial contracting
stage.
As for adverse selection, the solution concept from Bester and Strausz (2001) can be
used. The contract is such that the agent is indifferent between exerting high or low effort
and randomizes such that the principal is indifferent between continuing after the breakup
date or not. We formalize this in the following. Denote the agent’s probability of exerting
low effort as q. The principal’s maximization problem at the breakup date is
max
p,S
(1− q)(pWC + (1− p)W
C
A ) + q(pWF + (1− p)W
F
A )− S
s.t. S + pVF ≥ 0
S + pVF ≥ 0
By Assumption 1 and Condition 1, VF ≥ VC , so that the individual rationality constraint
of the agent that had exerted high effort will be made binding. Therefore, S = −pVC .
Plugging S into the principal’s profits and rearranging yields
(1− q)WCA + qW
F
A + p
[
(1− q)(VC −W
∆
C ) + q(VC −W
∆
F )
]
.
44
The principal has no incentive to renegotiate (p∗ = 0) if the expression in square brackets
in (weakly) negative. This is the case if q ≥ q∗m, where
q∗m =
VC −W
∆
C
W∆F −W
∆
C
.
A renegotiation proof high effort contract is feasible if q∗m ≤ 1. Note that the minimal
probability of not exerting effort q∗m for moral hazard is similar to the minimal probability
of free-riding types participating for adverse selection q∗ = [αC(VC−W
∆
C )]/[αF (W
∆
F −VC)]
(see Proposition 5).
Profits with the renegotiation proof contract with a breakup date are larger than with
a contract without a breakup date if
(1− q∗m)(W
C
A + p
∗(VC −W
∆
C )− kC) + q
∗
m(W
F
A + p
∗(VF −W
∆
F )− kF ) > W
F
A − kF
which can be rearranged to
(1− q∗m)(W
C
A −W
F
A ) + kF − kC > 0.
ForWCA ≥W
F
A ,
26 this condition always holds under Assumption 1, i.e. the principal always
prefers a contract with a breakup date, given that a renegotiation proof breakup date is
feasible.
E Viability of Project
In addition to adverse selection and moral hazard, a third explanation of breakup (and
of breakup dates in contracts) is that the firms find out that the project is non-viable.27
One possibility is that it is non-viable in general. This explanation would clearly predict
different empirical observations, since we should not observe that firms conduct research
on their own, after breaking up with their research partner (as it was observed for the
example of Airbus and Boeing). In other words, conditional on that the project was
26We have not made any assumptions on the relative magnitudes of WCA and W
F
A . However, it ap-
pears reasonable to assume that developing the product alone after having terminated the contract with a
committed (high effort) agent is more profitable than after a breakup with a (low effort) free-rider.
27In general, firms may never find out whether the project is viable or not unless the project is successfully
developed. See Besanko and Wu (2013) for a theory of R&D cooperation when the project viability is
unknown.
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developed successfully, the reason of breakup is limited to either adverse selection or moral
hazard. Therefore, the identification strategy for adverse selection versus moral hazard
described in Section 5 can be used if the project is potentially non-viable in general.
Another model of non-viability is that the research project is viable, but not by the
two firms cooperating together. It could be, for example, that the research cultures of the
two firms are incompatible, so that working together is an obstacle rather than a help.
The project may be viable after breakup. We will consider a model in more detail, which
includes both cases: the project not being continued after breakup and only one firm
continuing after breakup.
Take the simplest model of non-viability. With probability α the project is viable
together and the discovery rate is λT . With probability 1−α it is non-viable together and
the discovery rate is 0. Denote the discovery rate in case A continues the project alone
as λ. For the special case λ = 0, if the project is not viable together, it is not viable
by A alone either. Assume for the sake of simplicity that there is no private information
whatsoever, so that the two firms maximize joint profits. Denote the joint profit in case of
discovery w and the joint effort . By a similar argument as before, if the project is viable,
joint profits are
[∫ T
0
λT e
−λT t
(
e−rtw − 
∫ t
0
e−rτ dτ
)
dt
]
+
[(∫ ∞
T
λT e
−λT tdt
)(
−
∫ T
0
e−rτ dτ +max
{
0, e−rT
(∫ ∞
0
λe−λx
(
e−rxwA − 
∫ x
0
e−rτ dτ
)
dx
)})]
=WV +W
∆
V e
−(r+λT )T
where WV = (λTw − )/(r + λT ) is the expected net present value of A and B conducting
research together without a deadline, WA = max{0, (λwA− )/(r+λ)} is the expected net
present value of A conducting the project alone, and W∆V = WA −WV is the difference
between the two. The max{0, ·} expression is due to the fact that A may choose not to
continue the project alone if this were to generate a negative net present value (i.e. if
(λwA − )/(r + λ) < 0, a sufficient condition for this is λ = 0).
If the project is non-viable, the parties incur effort costs, without a discovery ever
realizing from their cooperation and then A conducts the research alone (if WA > 0) or
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completely discontinues the project (if WA = 0), which means a profit
− 
∫ T
0
e−rτ dτ +max
{
0, e−rT
(∫ ∞
0
λe−λx
(
e−rxwA − 
∫ x
0
e−rτ dτ
)
dx
)}
=WN +W
∆
N e
−rT
whereWN = −/(r+λT ) is the expected net present value of A and B conducting research
together without a deadline and W∆N = WA −WN is the difference between A conducting
the research alone and with B in case of non-viability.
The consortium chooses the breakup date such that it maximizes profits:
max
T
α
(
WV + e
−(r+λT )TW∆V
)
+ (1− α)
(
WN + e
−rTW∆N
)
.
Solving the first order condition, one gets the optimal breakup date
T ∗ =
1
λT
ln
(
−W∆V α(r + λT )
W∆N (1− α)r
)
If the probability of viability is α = 1, then breakup never occurs T ∗ =∞. (Or, if the
probability of viability is close to 1, never breaking up is close to optimal.) If WA > 0, A
continues the project alone after breakup. If WA = 0, A does not continue. This provides
an alternative explanation for breakup clauses in contracts: after having no discovery for
a longer time, it is very likely that the project is not viable (together), hence continuing
(together) does not pay off.
We can also make a statement about how the hazard rate of discovery evolves over
time. Observe that the probability that no discovery has been made up to some time t if
the project is viable (hazard rate λT ) is e
−λT t. If the project is non-viable (hazard rate 0),
the probability is 1. Given the prior belief α that the project is viable, by Bayes law the
posterior belief that the project is viable if no discovery was made after time t is
α˜(t) =
αe−λT t
αe−λT t + (1− α)1
.
One can show that for α ∈ (0, 1) the posterior probability is decreasing in time, i.e. α˜′(t) <
0, and for α = 1, the posterior probability is constant, i.e. α˜′(t) = 0.
The observed hazard rate at time t is λ˜T (t) = α˜(t)λT + (1− α˜(t))0. By the properties
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of α˜′, the observed hazard rate is decreasing over time, i.e. λ˜′T (t) < 0, if α ∈ (0, 1), and
constant, i.e. λ˜′T (t) = 0, if α = 1. Note that this holds no matter whether WA = 0 or
WA > 0.
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